including examination of each case country's political history, media market size, degree of ownership concentration, ethnic/linguistic structure, ideological polarization in politics, the character of its political system, as well as its state and judicial tradition. The second camp pushes in a quite different direction and argues that the basic problem with Hallin and Mancini's approach to comparing media systems is not that it is too narrow, but that it is too broad. Pippa Norris, perhaps the most prominent critic of Comparing Media Systems, is blunt. In her view, "the categorization proposed by Hallin and Mancini remains fuzzy, impressionistic, and unscientific" (2009: 334) . Norris challenges Hallin and Mancini's attempt to summarize their main ideas in the form of ideal types meant to capture key shared traits amongst the countries grouped as approximating to a greater or lesser extend one of their three suggested "models" and argues that comparative media research can only advance by focusing on clearly defined variables that can be measured and compared in a consistent fashion.
In this article, the comparative analysis of media system developments in the six countries covered is structured in a way that builds on Hallin and Variable (b) has been included to broaden the analysis beyond the newspaper industry to cover commercial television, the single largest media industry and an important underwriter of and source of news in many countries. Variable (c) has been included to accommodate the rise of new digital media, increasingly important not only for how people communicate amongst themselves, but also for how they search for information and access news.
The four variables included here do not allow for an exhaustive analysis of the six media systems in question. They exclude important dimensions highlighted by Hallin and Mancini, including relations between media organizations and political actors as well as developments in journalistic professionalism, and make no attempt to integrate the long list of potentially pertinent additional variables suggested by Humphreys and others (see for example Hardy 2012) . It is thus important to recognize that this analysis only captures a few important dimensions of media system developments in the countries covered. The focus is, as said, on media system in terms of industry structures, not practices and values, or content and forms. While this means the article leaves aside related questions concerning developments in forms of journalistic professionalism, political campaign communications, and the nature of news coverage, the advantage of the four variables chosen is that they allow for a parsimonious comparative analysis on the basis of measurable and consistent indicators, and can thus provide a solid basis for testing one important version of the convergence hypothesis and addressing the question of whether we have in fact seen a gradual Americanization of the media systems of other affluent democracies-a structural homogenization that would in turn have potentially profound implications for news provision and news consumption, as a growing body of research shows significant differences in different media systems' capacity to provide news, diversity of news provision, and ability to keep people informed (Curran et al 2009 , Esser et al 2012 .
On the basis of the four variables selected, the convergence hypothesis would lead one to expect that H 1 -newspaper revenue per capita converge towards American levels, as commercialization drives the development of new and more market-oriented newspapers, especially in Polarized Pluralist systems H 2 -commercial television revenue per capita converge towards American levels, as public service broadcasters lose ground and advertisers and audiences move to private providers in both Democratic Corporatist and Polarized Pluralist systems H 3 -levels of internet use converge towards American levels, as web access spreads across all media systems H 4 -levels of public sector support for public service media converge towards American levels, as Western European countries retreat from their previous commitments and become more "Liberal" in their approach to media policy To test whether this has in fact happened, the analysis focus on a strategic sample of six similarly affluent democracies from North America and Western Europe, namely Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. The sample includes two countries often seen as approximating each of Hallin and Mancini's three ideal types, namely the UK and the US for the "Liberal Model", Finland and Germany for the "Democratic Corporatist Model", and France and Italy for the "Polarized Pluralist Model". This sample allows for a critical test of the structural version of the convergence hypothesis as all the countries included comes from the set of most-similar systems on the basis of which Hallin and Mancini developed the idea.
If structural convergence is absent here, it is unlikely to be found amongst more-or mostdifferent systems. For each of the six countries, descriptive statistics on media industry developments, media use, and media policy has been gathered from international and domestic sources and vetted by a team of national experts involved in a larger, collaborative research project on the changing business of journalism and its implications for democracy.
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The absence of convergence in newspaper revenues, television revenues, internet use, and media policy Closer examination of empirical data on developments in newspaper industry revenues per capita, commercial television broadcasting revenues per capita, levels of internet use, and public funding for public service media organizations does not provide much support for the structural version of the convergence hypothesis. Though American-produced audiovisual content, journalistic professional norms and practices associated with America, and internet services provided by companies based in the US all play an important role in the five European countries covered here, in structural terms, their media systems have not converged on an American model. All media systems are unique in their own way (Humphreys 2012 ), but, even within the relatively similar population of affluent North American and Western European democracies, the American media system may well be particularly unique (Hardy 2012 ). The US is an outlier with a media system shaped by the particularities of a very large market serving a continental-size country with a heterogeneous population and a tradition, from the twentieth century onwards, of much more limited active state intervention in the media sector than what is seen in much of Western Europe. The US is very different even from the UK media system that is sometimes classified as another example of the "Liberal Model." This does not mean, however, that Hallin and Mancini's overall analysis finds no empirical support from the data reviewed here. While the classification of the US and the UK as approximations of the same ideal type seems problematic, the similarities between the two "Democratic Corporatist" media systems, Finland and Germany, and the two "Polarized Pluralist" media systems, France and Italy, are more pronounced, both in terms of their structural properties at any given point in time and in terms of how they develop over time.
Below, I go through the data for each variable in turn.
It is well known that the first decade of the twenty-first century has been tough on the newspaper industry in most affluent democracies. It is less often acknowledged that it has been particularly tough on the US newspaper industry, which has experienced a loss of revenue that is far greater than that of any of the five other countries covered here. Turning to developments in commercial television broadcasting, the US again stands out as not only different from the five European countries, but also persistently so. Whereas much of the newspaper industry has struggled over the last decade, commercial television has grown rapidly in all the countries covered here, with the sole exception of Germany. The growth of pay TV has transformed the dynamics of many television markets, where previously dominant free-to-air broadcasters, both private and public, suddenly face increased competition for viewers' attention, for advertising, and for exclusive rights for premium content from increasingly well-heeled pay TV competitors. In Italy, the traditional RAI-Mediaset "duopoly", pitting the public service media organization against Silvio Berlusconi's private commercial TV conglomerate has been shaken up by the arrival of Sky Italia-though Rupert Murdoch's Italian operation drew only about 4% of total TV viewing in 2009, its annual revenues of €2.6 billion were not much smaller than those of the two freeto-air giants. In the UK, the success of BSkyB (where Murdoch's News Corporation owns a 39.1% controlling stake) has turned the pay TV company into the country's largest broadcaster.
The growth of pay TV in Europe lends some credence to the convergence hypothesis.
Pay TV is one of those " [media] forms that first evolved in the United States," to quote Hallin and Mancini again. But, arguably in part due to the differences in market size that for example Peter Humphreys (2012) has argued comparative media researchers need to take into account, the sector has developed somewhat differently in most European countries. First, commercial television is still overall not nearly as strong in Western Europe as it is in the United States, (as can be seen from the massive differences in per capita revenue documented Across Western Europe, the biggest television audiences were gradually eroding too as more and more viewers opted for niche alternatives, but the combined share of the three largest channels still accounted for between 39 percent (Germany) and 62 percent (Finland) of all viewing (Nielsen 2012).
Looking at commercial television revenue per capita, there is limited support for H 2 , the hypothesis that commercial television revenue per capita is converging on American levels. Revenues have grown rapidly in most European countries, driven in large part by the rise of pay TV, a form of media that evolved earlier on in the US. This development has been accompanied by some audience fragmentation, a phenomenon also well-known from the US. The empirical developments documented here are more usefully summarized as a combination of (1) parallel displacements, (2) persistent particularities, and (3) some tendencies towards new peculiarities than as media systems converging on one, American, model. First, judging from this six-country sample, media systems across North America and Western Europe have seen parallel displacements in terms of newspaper industry revenues per capita, in terms of commercial television industry revenues per capita, and in terms of the increase in internet use. The pace of change differs from country to country, but the direction of travel is broadly speaking the same. Newspaper companies in all six countries remain overwhelmingly dependent on their legacy print business, which is in decline as audiences and advertisers migrate to other media and the recession takes its toll. Commercial television in all six countries is in the throes of a large-scale shift from being mostly based on free-to-air broadcasting and advertising to a multi-channel environment mixing ad-supported free channels with a growing number of pay TV offerings. Internet use has increased across the board (though growth has tapered off and universal access far from achieved). Looking at the three broad trends of parallel displacements, persistent particularities, and new peculiarities, it is clear that these different phenomena call for different explanations. Fully accounting for the often dramatic developments that many media systems have undergone during the first decade of the twenty-first century will obviously require much more than a single article, but as a first approximation one might suggest that the parallel displacements are broadly associated with technological change and how media organizations, media users, and advertisers have reacted to it (increased competition for audiences and advertising as a result of a vast increase in media choice driven in large part by the rise of multi-channel television and the spread of the internet). The persistent particularities, in contrast, seems much more rooted in inherited political, cultural, and economic differences as national media policy traditions are maintained, media habits built over decades change only slowly (especially for older generations), and different legacy media business models remain relevant even when under increased pressure from new alternatives appealing to the same audiences and advertisers (essentially an argument about what institutionalists call "path dependence", a term invoked by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as well as Humphreys (1996 Humphreys ( , 2012 ). New peculiarities, finally, such as the relative prominence of non-profit and online-only news organizations in the US, are surely rooted partly in political and cultural differences, but also seem to reflect different interactions between technological developments and economic forces as lowered barriers to entry, cheaper content-production, and easier forms of dissemination coupled with vastly increased competition can result in the proliferation of niche media in a large media market like the American one but may not underpin major new entrants in smaller European markets, simply because of an absence of critical mass.
Even such a brief examination of the interplay of forces driving different aspects of media system developments suggests a need to revisit our theoretical understanding of how media systems change over time. The idea that differences in politics and culture are the main factors behind divergence, and that economic and technological factors in contrast drive convergence seems problematic, for example. This is in part because of assumptions about how these factors work and interact that rely in part on how they worked in the particular setting of mid-twentieth century Western "mass societies." Economic forces and technological developments have been seen as the drivers of structural convergence between media systems by Hallin and Mancini, Humphreys, and others because media systems have been seen through the lens of mass media, mass production, and mass markets.
In a condensed form, the theoretical reasoning behind this aspect of the convergence hypothesis (the part of the explanatory logic that is not about politics, but about capitalism) goes as follows-if the commercial logics of the media sector leads media companies to seek to maximize their audience, the development of new technologies that let companies produce more content and reach more people gives an advantage to large players who can invest in such equipment, who can spend on the production value and volume of content, and who can still keep prices low at the point of consumption by leveraging economies of scale and the indirect subsidy offered by advertisers interested in reaching large numbers of people. Such companies are the "catch-all media" that Hallin and Mancini write about (2004a: 267), mass media who mass produce content and constitute their large, undifferentiated audiences as mass consumers on mass markets. Unchecked by regulation, such catch-all media can over time crowd out smaller players, leading to standardization, market concentration, and the dominance of companies that can use the comparative advantage of large home markets to dominate neighboring markets-it can lead to commercialization, to structural convergence, to "Americanization." And indeed such trends were visible in much of Western Europe in the late twentieth century.
But the absence of structural Americanization in the early twenty-first century documented here suggests the logic behind this story may be changing in subtle ways today.
This change takes nothing away from the fundamental points made by Hallin and Mancini, Humphreys, and others about media systems as defined by political, cultural, economic, and technological forces, but recast how we understand the interaction between these forces (and hence the likely outcomes) at a different historical conjuncture. Hallin and Mancini were writing about "catch-all media" at a point in time where most major broadcasters and newspapers were giving up on the idea that you could appeal to everyone all the time. The change in question is an aspect of a broader move away from the paradigmatic forms of twentieth-century "mass societies" with their concomitant mass media, mass production, and mass markets towards a new situation increasingly characterized by more fragmented media landscapes (Neuman 1991), flexible specialization in production (Priore and Sabel 1984) , and niche marketing (Turow 2011) . Because media are highly endogenous institutions, these broader changes change how media systems operate and develop. If we are moving from a situation in which the mass media industries were one of the last holdouts from a receding production-centered "Fordist" model to a situation in which media industries are increasingly operating on more user-oriented "post-Fordist" premises that match the rest of the economy of most affluent democracies, then economic and technological forces can in fact combine in ways that result in divergence, or at least media system developments characterized by ongoing structural differences (rather than the hypothesized convergence). In a "Fordist" environment, economic and technological factors conspire to favor standardization, but in a "post-Fordist" environment, firms have both the means and the motives to cater to niche audiences, and as long as people's interests differ, companies will succeed by catering to these different interests. Thus, the America, the French, and the German media system remain very different today in part because of inherited political and cultural differences (the traditional barriers to convergence), but also because contemporary economic and technological forces-no longer premised on mass production for mass markets, but increasingly on tailored production to niche markets-no longer necessarily erode systemic differences. In terms of advancing comparative media research, it is not clear that notions like "Americanization", "Europeanization", "Italianization" and the like-however rhetorically appealing-are well-suited to capture developments in actually existing media systems. More seems to be gained from empirical analysis of real types organized around key variables than from broad generalizations based on national stereotypes. The argument presented here suggests a further need to revisit our basic theoretical understand ing of the forces, and interplay of forces, that drive media system developments to advance truly dynamic analysis of differences and similarities between systems tracked over time. The forces that change our media systems can still be captured under the broad headings of political, cultural, economic, and technological factors familiar to all comparative media researchers. But as media systems around the world change in part as parts of broader transformations pointing beyond the paradigmatic forms of twentieth century "mass societies", it seems clear that the forces involved in these changes are also themselves changing, and that we should not necessarily expect for example new technological developments-digital convergence, ubiquitous computing, the rise of the mobile web-to have the same structural implications as previous technological developments. In the late twentieth century, economic and technological forces may have driven media system convergence between otherwise politically and culturally different affluent democracies. In the early twenty-first century, economic and technological forces are certainly still changing our media systems, but it is far from clear that they change points towards structural homogenization, let alone "Americanization."
i Analysis of some research questions call for more than country -to-country comparisons, adding super-or subnational levels of analysis (Pfetsch and Esser 2008) or focusing on objects of analysis that do not coincide with geographical territories, such as transnational "media cultures" (Hepp and Couldry 2009) .
ii Hallin (2009) has on some occasions expressed some reservations about the convergence hypothesis, but in the concluding section of their follow-up edited volume Comparing Media Systems Beyond the W estern World (Hallin and Mancini 2012: 284) , the two authors call the convergence hypothesis "correct to a significant extent" when it comes to affluent democracies even as they recognize that there has been no pronounced global media system convergence.
iii Others have tested aspects of the convergence hypothesis when it comes to news content in newspapers (Benson and Hallin 2007) and television (Aalberg et al 2010) and have found that national differences have generally not diminished over time. 
